Bangladesh in Transition: India’s Concerns, US Interests, and China’s Gains

As Seen from Delhi: Where India, US, and China Stand in Post-Hasina Dhaka

Photo by Bornil Amin on Unsplash

In August, after 15 years as Bangladesh's Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina was forced to resign and flee to India after protesters stormed her official residence.

The dramatic fall of India’s long-time ally caused great concern in Delhi. Under Hasina, Bangladesh became India’s biggest development partner, with $8 billion in Indian investments in infrastructure, energy, and connectivity. Hasina steered Bangladesh’s GDP from $102 billion in 2009 to $460 billion in 2022, reducing poverty and setting the country on track for middle-income status by 2026. 

It was under Hasina, that India’s defence and security cooperation with Bangladesh, with whom it shares a porous 4096 km long border, finally came of age. Delhi saw Dhaka’s “iron lady” as a buffer against an assortment of insurgent groups that had previously operated from Bangladesh to destabilize India’s North East. Hasina’s government was also cracking down on jihadists and Islamist groups that have long been inimical to both Indian and Bangladeshi interests. 

Hasina’s removal has emboldened forces with a staunch dislike for India. The unelected, interim government that replaced Hasina plans to stay in power for an undefined length of time until it brings about reforms in the country's polity. The global elite finds comforting refuge in the composition of this government, which includes two student leader advisors and is led by economist Muhammad Yunus-Nobel Laureate, a long time friend of the Clintons, a symbol of "hope." However, many in India are worried about the uncomfortable truths behind this facade: violence against the country’s religious minorities and supporters of Hasina, Islamist groups regaining political ground, and an enabling environment for radicalism. 

Critics have long accused India of propping up her regime, emboldening her to act with impunity. In the months leading to her ouster, several opposition figures had accused her of merely serving the interests of her “foreign masters” in Delhi, trading Bangladesh’s sovereignty for their political backing. Now with Hasina gone, there are calls for re-examining and cancelling agreements signed with India over the last 15 years. Radical Islamists released by the Yunus government have predictably warned of breaking up India with China’s help. 

This resurgence of anti-India sentiment is not new-neither for Bangladesh nor for several others in India’s neighbourhood. In a region where India is the dominant power, New Delhi is often a major factor in the domestic politics of many of its smaller neighbours-Bangladesh, Pakistan, Maldives, Sri Lanka or Nepal. However, practical realities often follow political grandstanding on ties with India. Maldives’ President Muizzu, whose rise to power in 2023 came on the back of an 'India Out' campaign, hailed India as a true friend this week, as India unveiled a bailout package for the debt-ridden country. Over the last few months, he has backtracked on his anti-India rhetoric, even possibly removing vocal India critics from his government.  Sri Lanka’s new President Dissanayake whose victory in the 2024 September elections was seen as a setback for India has assured India that Colombo will remain cognizant of Indian security interests. Even the unrecognized Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which in the 1990s and 2000s had actively facilitated Pakistan’s use of terror against India, is now engaging with India, as Kabul’s ties with Islamabad deteriorate. 

Barring a 270 km border with Myanmar, Bangladesh is surrounded by India on all sides. Economic and geographical realities will ultimately triumph over all else. 

Even as many in New Delhi observe with caution, Bangladesh’s interim government and other historically hostile political forces such as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami that now exercise influence outside the government have begun talking about engagement. India has broadened its political outreach in Dhaka.

Delhi is also observing the role and posture of other key players in Bangladesh, mainly the US and China.

The View from Delhi: US in Bangladesh

A perspective shared by a growing number in Indian strategic circles is that the US played a very unhelpful role stirring the Bangladesh pot. The US has officially denied  allegations of its involvement in the Bangladesh crisis. However, there is plenty that strengthens the suspicions of Indian sceptics. Washington had consistently and publicly criticized and deployed a range of punitive measures against the Hasina government to check her alleged authoritarianism. The then US Ambassador’s political hyperactivism before Bangladesh’s January elections was understood as Washington cozying up to the Bangladeshi opposition at a time when relations were tense with the government. In May, Hasina herself had insinuated that a “white skinned country”-understood to be a reference to the US-had threatened to remove her unless she agreed to allowing them to set an airbase in Bangladesh. 

Hasina’s quick replacement with Yunus is also viewed as proof of US’ role, given Yunus’ strong ties to the US. Sceptics viewed Yunus’ warm embrace-literal and figurative-by a range of powerful individuals during his September trip to the US, from President Biden, senior US officials and senators to financiers like Alex Soros as a celebration of a job well done.

A year before Hasina’s ouster, India reportedly lobbied the US government to tone down its pro-democracy rhetoric, arguing that without Hasina, Bangladesh will become a breeding ground for radicalism, posing a serious threat to US’s key security partner, India. Critics say that India's all-eggs-in-the-Hasina basket approach costed Delhi dearly. However, India was in touch with the opposition, including those with a history of hostility towards India. Moreover, India was invested in furthering a mutually beneficial strategic partnership with the government of Bangladesh-which at the time was led by Hasina. Interfering in Bangladesh's domestic politics by reprimanding its Prime Minister was not India's prerogative.

Privately and on social media, some Indian observers—who generally support the growing ties between the US and India—have expressed concerns that the US, while willing to back totalitarian regimes when it aligns with its interests, may inadvertently empower even worse actors in the long run through its democracy promotion efforts. Scant consideration for long term regional stability is likely to leave the region vulnerable to greater influence by other major powers, most notably, China. 

With India being among the most important US partners in countering China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific, the Bangladesh crisis raises questions about how aligned US and Indian interests are in South Asia.

The View from Delhi: China in Bangladesh

During her tenure, Hasina maintained a balanced foreign policy, positioning India as a political ally and China as a key development partner, playing both powers to maximize development assistance. It was largely understood in Delhi that even as Beijing and New Delhi compete for influence in the Bay of Bengal, they were in the same camp-supportive of Hasina–when the US was backing the opposition.

Since Hasina’s ouster, China is poised to exploit the growing anti-Indian sentiment to project itself as the more politically acceptable, neutral friend–one without the glaring Hasina baggage. Chinese diplomats have been engaging with previously sidelined actors like Jamaat-e-Islami, signaling Beijing’s readiness to pro-actively expand its influence. The BNP has also welcomed China’s commitment to the people of Bangladesh. In contrast, Bangladeshi critics allege that India placed Hasina over the interests of Bangaldeshi people.

Beijing’s political outreach will also be helped by the fact that the Pakistan tabboo in Bangladesh, a result of Islamabad’s role in the genocide of Bengalis in the lead up to Bangladesh’s independence, is now eroding. Despite recent hiccups in their ties, the China-Pakistan relationship makes enduring strategic sense. 

From an Indian perspective, Bangladesh today is a bit of a Deja vu to the early 1970s–with US, Pakistan and China on one page, and India on another. However, today, the external environment is markedly different, as is the nature of ties between these countries. Pakistan is no longer the US' most valued partner in the region. US and India are cooperating across all major policy areas to counterbalance China in the Indo-Pacific. The US might have welcomed Hasina’s fall, but ironically, it is likely, that this time, Beijing with favorable political circumstances, its well-received outreach in Dhaka and its financial leverage over Bangladesh, will receive the most spoils out of this shift.

Jyotsna Mehra is Founder, Closed Door.

The views expressed above belong to the author(s).